# AFFIRMATIVE

### AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do Both

#### Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” *Air War College*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

#### Close collaboration is good

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD’s close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized – bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

### AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do CP

#### Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

#### State controls security cooperation – all DOD SC is carried out through embassies under direct supervision of State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Who Conducts Security Cooperation The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Strategic / National Level The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15 Operational and Tactical Level The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility. Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments.16

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in a country. The President gives the Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927).17 The Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) within the Country Team. The SCO includes all DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA and SC management functions under titles 22 and 10 USC. SCOs typically include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.18

#### Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

### AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---DOD vs DOS

#### The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

#### The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA493001.pdf>)//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

### AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---Trust

#### Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

#### The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

#### Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/>)//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

### AFF---DOS---AFF Solvency---AT Bergmann

#### State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

#### Even Bergmann admits structural reforms in the DoS would be necessary for solvency

1NC Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is “not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy” security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department’s lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.